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I. lNTRODUCTION 
Since the rising of lhe Zaporozhian Cossacks in 1648, Russian expansion 
into Europe has been a prominent theme of our history and an inescapable 
reference point in European strategic thinking. Today's strategic Ihinking 
must begin by recognizing that this entire 350 year process has been reversed 
in less than three. For most Europeans, this is not regarded as a security 
problem, but as the Iifting of a huge security burden - and for the states of 
the ex-Soviet empire and Warsaw Pact of a good many more pernicious burdens 
as well. But if We want to understand the Russian perception of these deve-
lopments, we had best recaIl T. S. EIlio!'s dictum: «humankind cannot bear 
much reality». By any standard, Russia's elites have had too much reality to 
bear - externally to be sure, and, more importandy, within both Russia and 
the former Soviet Union itself. We in the West right1y approach their 
struggle with sympathy. We must also approach it with e1ear-headedness. 
11. FlRST PRINCIPLES 
Clear-headed analysis and prognosis must proceed from two sobering facts: 
2.1 First, the events of August 1991 were not a revolution, but a collapse. 
This is not because the revolution was «faked», but because it simply is not 
possible to have a revolution of lhe e1assical kind against a system as entren-
ched, as pervasive and as corrosive as that which Lenin, Stalin and Brezhnev 
buli!. To talk about dislodging this system in a month, a year or even ten 
years is about as realistic as talking about removing a man's vertebrae from 
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his body. In August 1991, the Communist system was decapitated, long before 
that the heart stopped pumping, but to this day, the vertebrae - the structu-
res, institutions, and elites of the old USSR - remain very largely in place. 
2.2 Second, however impressed we might be by the figure of Boris 
Yeltsin, the issue today is not Yeltsin or any other personality, but the 
750000 people who really run Russia. Half of these people are unreeons-
tructed and probably unreformablc. The other half - for reasons of self-
-interest as well as national interest - want to change, but for the most 
part do not know how. So long as these people think and work in traditional 
ways, even the most radical Russian President will be nothing more than 
the titular head of this country. So long as we focus upon personalities rather 
than upon elites and institutions, we will fai! to see who rea11y holds power 
and will find our expectations continually disappointed. 
In the old Soviet Union, it was elear who held power: lhe KGB, the 
Armed Forces, the mi!itary-industrial complex, the state bureaucracy and, 
penetrating and linking them ali, the Communist Party apparatus. As the 
dust settIes, we are likely to find that, with the exception of the Communist 
Party apparatus, power is held by the successors to the KGB, the Armed 
Forces the military-industrial complex and the state bureaucracy. With the 
demise of the Communist Party as a mechanism of command and supervision, 
we might also find that these institutions have become more autonomous 
than they were before and in some cases more opaque to outsiders, incJuding 
the country's political leadership. 
To be sure, the power which these institutions now enjoy is almost 
entirely negative. Their guardians have lost, and will not easi!y regain, the 
ability to aehieve most of their own positive objectives. What they do pos-
sess is the ability to maintain themselves in being and dilute, sabotage and 
derai! the projects of others. Yeltsin's concessions to the defence industrial 
lobby in April (and consequent dilution of Gaydar's government with fresh 
ministerial appointments in May), his appointment of Army General Pave1 
Grachev as Defence Minister on 18 May, and the publication of the new 
ntilitary doctrine in June suggest that he has a shrewd sense of where power 
actually lies. 
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m. OBSTACLES TO CHANGE 
In four areas, the legaeies of old elites, old institutions and old h.bits 
of mind wiII prove very difficult to root oul. 
3.1. The first of these, obviously, is the multi-national structure of 
old Soviet Union itself. The Soviet Union was deliberately set up - geogra-
phicaIIy, demographicaIIy and economicaIIy - to be as interdependent as 
a straight-jacket. Until vel'y recently (if not still), Russian leaders, Boris 
Yeltsin inciuded, believed Ihat these inlerdependencies would force mistrusl-
fui and even anlagonistie republics to coordinate their policies and preserve 
lhe essence of a Soviel Union in aI! bul name. (On lhe day afler thc CIS was 
formed Yeltsin himself stated: <<if Ukraine refuses to join the new union 
(sic), they will be on one side of a barricade and we on another».) 
This was always a very questionable analysis. For one thing, lhe econo-
mie dependeneies of the old Soviet Union were to a large extent wasleful, 
exploitative and misaligned: an obstaele, not an asseI, lo creating normal. 
productive economies and balanced trading relationships. Moreover, anti-
pathy to the Soviet empire is so great in the European parts of old Union 
(and the Caucasus), that a large proportion of its noo-Russian iohabitants 
would divorce themselves from <<integrated structures» even if it were econo-
micaIly irrational to do so. In the short term the costs of divorce wiII cer-
tainly prove painful, and many in lhe Rllssian Armed Forces and security 
services plainly seek lo make Ihem llnendurable for the peoples concerned. 
3.2. A seeond area of eoncern is the Rllssian economy itself. Markets 
wiII not be eslablished by lhe very people who oppose them. Yct, the Russian 
governmenl, partly out of confusion and partly oul of necessity, is relying 
upon lhe old Soviel bureaucracy to dismantle the old command struclures. 
When local bureaucrals obstruct ralher than assist, the centre responds in 
a characteristieaIIy Bolshevik way: by stl'engthening the power of lhe centre. 
Whereas Prime Minislers Ryzhkov and Pavlov I'educed the number of 
cenlral offieials from 70000 to 36000, the numbers since Augusl have 
cIimbed (from 800 lo 2000 in lhe Minislry of Agriculture alone). Yeltsin 
chairs over 20 commissions and mainlains foul' separate advisory slaffs. The 
result in posl-Soviet conditions is nol a relul'n lO SovicI-style centralisalion, 
bul administralive anarchy. Today, exporl Iicenses must be renewed quarlerly, 
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and export quotas, registration and authorisation documents are issued by 
a host of separate authorities, each doing its best to undermine the other. 
In these conditions, «accountability spreads like watery porridge» and the 
decrees of Yeltsin and Gaydar are little more than conversation pieces. 
3.3. A distinct, but no less vital issue is the defence complex, a complex 
with no analogue in the West or, for that matter, in any ex-Warsaw Pact 
country. (The entire armaments industry of Slovakia employed 80000 people 
at its peak, fewer than the number employed by the Pleshakov science-
production association alone.) 
Yet the most intractable problem with the defence economy is not its 
scale but its nature: by design, a separate and autarkic economy, with its 
own system of supply, support and pricing, operating entirely at variance 
with market principIes. AIthough this complex has historically been responsible 
for most of the country's qualíty civilian production, very few of its facilities 
could survive under market conditions. These enterprises were never efficient, 
only effective: an effectiveness achieved by production and qualíty control 
methods so wasteful of labour and materiaIs that they would have bankrupted 
Detroit in the 1930's. If the complex itself remained «solvent», this is largely 
because it was permitted to purchase its inputs and raw materiais at one-
-third to one-seventh the price paid by enterprises in the Soviet civilian sector. 
The real price was paid by the country, whose assets were systematically 
stripped and plundered. 
For this reason, a market economy which excludes the defence complex 
is not a market economy. To say «we will free all prices except those in the 
defence secton> is líke saying, «we will tax all incomes except those derived 
from worb>. Either the complex is propped up by exemptions and subsidies 
(in which case, the plunder continues); or the props are removed and the 
complex collapses, at a social and polítical cost which probably no Russian 
government could withstand. Yeltsin is bound to put polítical survival ahead 
of economic consistency. His concessions to the defence industrial lobby 
will neither save the complex, nor help the country, but they are dictated 
by the unfavourable balance Df polítical power which be confronts. 
3.4 The final area of difficulty is the Armed Forces. It remains a very 
opaque institution. After the coup, most assumed that the outsiders, the pro-
-YeItsin military reformers in the USSR Supreme Soviet, would become 
122 
LlVING WITH RUSSIA IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA 
the new insiders. They did noto Aftel' the formal demise of the USSR in 
Deeember, they still did noto EarIy this year, their tribune, Major Vladimir 
Lopatin, claimed «the Yazov group of offieers still dominate the General 
Staff»; there is no transpareney, no diseussion, no reformo The force of 
this assessment has been eonfirmed by thl'ee reeent developments in Russian 
defenee poliey. 
a. The first of these is the establishment of a military-dominated 
Russian Ministry of Defenee with a military Defenee Minister after 
nine months of assuranees that a civilian minister would be appoin-
ted to head an all·civilian Defenee Ministry. The new minister, 
Pavel Graehev is not apologetie about these developments: civilian 
defenee ministers are «not part of our tradition», civilians «lack 
eompetence», the army is <<not psychologically ready». What is 
more, there will be a «striel demarcation !ine» belween lhe MoD 
and the General Staff. The functions of the former will be «po!itical 
and administrative», whereas the General Staff - which survived 
the coup almost intact - will retain its traditional prerogatives in 
the criticaI areas of <<operational and strategic planning». 
b. The second is a subtle, but unmistakeable, shift of policy with 
regard to the 600 000 Russian servieemen serving outside Russian 
territory. From 1 July, these forces - frequently the vietims of 
«provocation» in non-Russian republics and just as frequently the 
instigators of it - operate under new rules of engagement with 
local antagonists. ]f «threatened» (not merely attacked), local 
commanders need no longer seek the eentre's authorisation to respond; 
they may now arder «retaliation» (not merely defence), without 
clearance from higher authority. To underscore the point, Grachev 
has announced that in eurrent eonditions, it will be neeessary for 
MoD forces to exceed their eustomary remit and take on funetions 
hitherto reserved for Interior Ministry troops. 
The eonventional wisdom - tha! formations in «hot spots» operate 
oulside lhe contraI of central authority - is, like mueh eonventional 
wisdom, eorreet only if criticaI amendments are made to it. The first 
is that contraI beeomes an issue in those areas (Moldava, the Baltie 
states) where local forces wish to remain in defianee of the eentre's 
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wishcs, ralheI' lhan in those (e. g. Osetia) whieh local Russian forces 
would gladly depar!. Seeondly, «central authority» is not useful term, 
because «lhe authorities» are themselves divided, not only belween 
military and civilian, but between civilian and civilian. Third, whilst 
there is probably no eentralised, orchestrated strategy in Moldova 
and the Baltie states at present, there is nonetheless a eonspiraey of 
common instinct and purpose between local commanders and those 
whom Foreign Minister Kozyrev has recently termed the «war party» 
in Moscow. 
The common purpose, clearly, is to defea! separatists in a world 
where NATO, the EC and the IMF make it impossible to erush them: 
and to do so by intimidating, disrupting and exhausting to the point 
where lhe separatist populations themselves come lo Moscow seeking 
accommodation. (In the words of a Russian trade minis ter last Febru-
ary, <<in six months time, the Baltie states wil be begging lo be allowed 
to join the CIS»). In Moldova and the Baltics, scarcely a day goes by 
without confrontation be!ween the Russian ArmyjKGB and civil 
authority: an ali bul Hobbesian situation, whieh makes economic 
stabilisation, let alone eoherent policy making for the long-term, 
fanciful and which strengthens the «Moscow party» within each 
separatist movement: i. e., those calling for «gradualism», «interdepen-
dence», «equidistance» between East and West and «the historieal 
approach». For these reasons, Landsbergis and other advocates of a 
fully independent, pro-Western ecurse in the Baltics are now weaker 
than they were six months ago. 
e. The final development is the publication in J une of a draft military 
doctrine for the Russian Armed Forces. Labelled, with due obeisance 
to Gorbachev era «new thinking», as a «defensive doctrine» Df 
«flexible response» foI' «repulsing aggression», it is testimony to 
the grip of old thinking on the Soviet military mind. 
1) Like ali pre-Gorbaehevian military doctrines, it is based upon 
a worst case analysis of polential enenties and their capabilities. 
The United States is portrayed as Russia's most formidable 
potential rival. NATO - which the General Staff had credited 
with the intention of expanding to the Soviet bordel' after the 
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Warsaw PaCI colIapsed - is also credited wilh the wherewithal 
to assemble 71 divisions on M day. 
2) As before 1987, the purpose of military doctrine is stated to be 
the preparation of the armed forces, economy and society for 
«world war». The threats identified by Army General Grachev 
differ little from Ihose idenlified by Marshal Grechko: slales 
having «a system of bases elose lo Russia's borders», «the massing 
of troops and naval groupings adjacenl to ils borders», the 
<<Ínlroduclion of foreign troops onlo lhe lerritory of adjoining 
slales», lhe possession of powerful armed forces «by certain 
states», and the maintenance of rapid mobilisation capabililies. 
With respect lO lhe threals which actually confronl lhe Russian 
state - the spillover of national confliels within lhe old Union, lhe 
loss of control over subordinate formalions (and armament), and 
civil conflict wilhin Russia itse\f - lhe new doctrine offers no 
guidance. Nor does il demand Ihat which today is plainly urgenl: 
capability (and expertise) in crisis managemenl and de·escalation. 
Now as before, lhe business of mililary doclrine is war·fighting 
and viclory. 
3) The capabililies demallded also have a discordanl ring: oul of 
lune with NATO's defence reductions as well as lhe Gaydar 
leam's assessmenl of Russia's economic possibililies and national 
interesls. According to Grachev, the mixed, but largely professional 
army of 1.5 million men, scheduled lo replace today's 2.8 million 
man conscripl force by lhe year 2000, will dispose of «highly 
accurale» armament and «will have ils fighling leveI enhanced». 
NOI only will an operational-strategic leveI rapid-deployment force 
wil\ be established - a measure roughly complementing NATO's 
own efforts - buI, in addition, half lhe forces in each military 
district will be mainlained in «conslanl combal readiness». Russia's 
neighbours are bound to ask why such readiness is required. NATO 
is reducing combal readiness, lhe condition of ex-Warsaw Pact 
military eslablishmenls is parlous (and likely lo remain sol and 
Ukraine, according to lhe Russian General Slaff's own public 
assessment, lacks a viable armaments industry as well as the 
means to conduct war at an operational-strategic scale. 
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4) Russia's neighbours will be equally unsettled by Graehev's views 
on war-fighting, Now as mueh as in Gorbaehevian times, the 
General Staff is seeldng to reeoneile a politieally motivated 
«defensive doetrine» with a multi-variant strategy and offensive 
eoneepts of operations, As Graehev has stated: 
«ÍI by no means follows that we should a1ways defend ourselves 
always and everywhere, In the event Df aggression, we have 
the right to ehoose the means of eombat which we deem most 
effeetive in the existing situation,» 
What kind of operations does Graehev's formula permit, and 
what does it rule out? Does it mean that, if attaeked, Russian 
forces will undertake offensive aetion at a taetieal 01' operational-
-taetieal seale to restore the status quo ante? OI' does it mean 
that, if attaeked (OI' «threatened»), Russian forces will launeh 
an operational-strategie offensive to «erush the aggressor» and 
ereate a new status quo? There is nothing in today's definition Df 
«defensiveness» whieh rules out the latter (charaeteristieally 
Soviet) view Df war-fighting and victory, 
d, These are the General Staff's ideas and not those Df Grachev alone, 
Each Df them - professionalisation and mixed manning, rapid 
deployment forces, hi-tech armament aI lower force leveis, the need 
for offensive and pre-emptive capabilities, lhe «absurdity» of defensive 
defence - were spelled out in spring 1991 by Army General Lobov 
(OGS from 29 August to 7 December 1991), who, in turn, was both 
reflecting and refining military orthodoxies developed by the General 
Staff in the early 1980's, 
IV, PROGNOSIS 
4,1. The collapse of the Soviet Union brings to mind the ancienl Chinese 
curse: ~may ali your dreams come true», Withoul doubt, the ideological cum 
mililary threat to Europe which became synonymous with «the Soviet Union» 
has disappeared, Russia's new leaders nol only seek, but have a compelling 
126 
LIVING WITH RUSSIA IN THE POST·SOVIET ERA 
interest in, cooperation with Iheir former adversaries. The West is engaged, 
and it has influence. Yet, despite these bIessings, Ihis is the kind of dream 
that keeps peopIe up at night. Without a substantial dispIacement of elites, 
authority structures and habits of mind, YeItsin's policies stand littIe chance of 
producing significant and enduring change. Instead, it is likeIy that mass 
support wilJ erode, whilst oId elites remain disaffected. Under these condi-
tions, a future putsch by the {,forces of arder» is sureIy possibIe. 
But it is far from certain. The {'amateur coup» of August 1991 is a 
monument to the folly of ilJ·prepared and ilI-considered action. As such, it 
is both a warning and a challenge to future pIotters. For three reasons, those 
who consider action may welI concIude tbat it is ill-advised as well as 
unnecessary. 
a. Lack 01 cOl1lidel1ce al1d cohesioll. To be abIe to organise and act, 
putschists must have a mission in common, they must be convinced 
of their own fitness to rule and must be confident of wider support. 
«Restoring Russia's dignity» is a powerful sentiment, but it is not a 
political programme. Whilst this wilJ not disturb every potentiaI 
intriguer, we must distinguish between those who can threaten 
governments and those who can topple them. Do the majority of key 
pIayers (Le. those whose support is essentiaI) know what to do once a 
government is toppIed? Are they wiIIing to suffer the internationaI cost? 
Do tbey believe that «order» can be restored at an acceptabIe internai 
cost, if at alI? 
To be sure, Bolsheviks were not troubled by cost, but Bolsheviks 
were fanatics, motivated by a radiant future. Fanaticism cannot 
exist without ideais. Not only is there no radiant future on offer, 
but Russia, unlike post-Wilhelmine Germany, has no «goIden age» 
to restore. The Soviet Union's defeat was not military, but moraL 
Leaders as welI as foIlowers are ideoIogicalIy exhausted. For these 
reasons, analogies with Bolshevik Russia and Weimar Germany 
are misconceived. In post·Soviet conditions, energy and passions 
are more IikeIy to be directed towards shabby and modes! pursuits 
than grand designs. 
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b. Lack of authority. To risk action, putschists must be reasonably 
confident that their subordinates will obey them. Yet, the institutions 
that matter are fragmented and factionalised, rather than centralised 
and cohesive. The question today is not «what is your legal 
authority?», but «who answers to you in practice?». Months before 
August 1991, the defence industrial complex, Armed Forces and KGB 
were divided. The marvel is not that the putschists were defied, but 
that they acted. These institutions may be unreformable (and in Ihat 
sense «strong»), but this does not mean they are easy to mobilise 01' 
move. 
c. Lack of Ilecessity. The Armed Forces, KGB and defence complex 
might overcome these inhibitions if their existence were truly threate· 
ned. Yet, despite Yeltsin's policies, these institutions have been remar· 
kably suecessful aI defending turf and clawing back losses. One year 
after the coup, it is clear that the ehanges have changed little. Their 
more resourcefulleaders know that it is wiser to transform a legitima· 
te government from within than to overthrow it. 
4.2. Therefore, we must not triek ourselves into believing Ihal the choices 
before Russia are either success of the reforms and «stability» or faiJure and 
chaos. If those who hold legal power continue to make eoncessions to those 
who hold real power, we migh! end up with faiJure and stability. 
4.3. We must a[so take with a pinch of sal! warnings about the reactionary 
threat. Gaydar's team is threatened by «moderates»: by managers who make 
up Arkadiy Volskiy's Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, by bure· 
aucrats and power brokers, associated with the Civic Union, who run par· 
liaments and local authorities, and by the professionals in charge of Russia's 
army, KGB and Ministry of Internai Affairs. They are no! an angry mob, 
but a coalition of seasoned level·headed practitioners who, increasingly, 
are undermining Gaydar from withing the Russian government. We should 
have no illusions about the balance of forces: Gaydar, in the words of 
Volskiy's deputy, Vladislavlev, is «a soloist without an orchestra»; true 
democrats (those with a non·Communist past) are minute in number and 
effectively sidelined; «principled» Communists do not hold power and are 
unlikely to hold it again. 
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4.4. When the dust setlles, we may find a Russia more regionalised and 
fragmented, but otherwise little changed: largely unreformed and no longer 
reforming, inhospitable to its own minorities, menacing to newly indepen-
dent states. Whilst having no wish to revive the cold war, it will be deter-
mined to rebuild its army and remain a power on its own vast periphery: 
Eastem Europe, Central Asia and possibly lhe Gulf and Far East. It will 
not threaten members of NATO and, vis a vis ex-Soviet republics, will prefer 
«active measures» to war. But it will not become a «security partner» either, 
let alone a good neighbour. 
4.5. Thus, the odds of «a thousand Yugoslavias» may be lower than 
the odds of a new stagnation. To be sure, there will be hot spots as we11 as 
bright spots ahead, but Russia is likely to remain, for the most part, a drab 
and inert place, where the gulf between those who lack power and Ihose 
who hold it - between obshchestvo (society) and gosudarstvo (state) - is 
wide and, to ali appearances, unbridgeable. Russians are more resigned to 
this situation than outsiders suppose, and their deep reserves of cynicism, 
wit and tenderness enable them to endure what others would not tolera te. 
4.6. But like Brezhnevian stagnation, post-Soviet stagnation wi11 not 
last forever. Contradictions will mount. No amount of Westem aid will 
enable the state to underwrite a largely unreformed economy or indefinitely 
buy off those who can shut the country down: e. g., the workers in the fuel 
and energy complex, as we11 as those in the defence complex, who 
Volsky boasts could be «brought out» in hours. In time, new pressures from 
below will appear and new revolutionary leaders will emerge. But we should 
accept that, for the time being at least, the revolutionary wave has crested 
and revolutionary energy is spent. 
V. WESTERN INFLUENCE AND WESTERN ASSISTANCE 
5.1. It is a truism to say that Russia's evolution will be determined by 
internai forces outside our control. We do, however, remain importaot in the 
margins. NATO, EC, G-7 and IMF have a decided influence in encouraging 
adherence to troop withdrawal schedules and in stimulating potential putschists 
129 
NAÇÃO E DEFESA 
to achieve their ends by less dramatic means. As a form of danegeld, aid can 
be used to advance Iimited Westem aims. 
5.2. But if our pUl'pose is not danegeld, but transformation, we should 
have no iIIusions. Massive state-to-state aid is more likely to retard positive 
change thao encourage it. Civil society is the precondition for an effective aid 
programme, not its consequence. Placed in the hands of those who now run 
Russia, credits will help the military industrial complex delay the inevitable 
and convince the Armed Forces that they have a «hi-tech» future. It will do 
nothing to cure the vices of Russian administrative and factory cuIture, which 
in themselves are the greatest obstacle to free markets and normal business 
practices. FinalIy, credits will only deepen the divide between «haves» and 
«have nots» and convince ordinary Russians that we are it bed with their 
oppressors. The greatest dangel' is not - as is so often portrayed - that we 
deny Russia aid and disillusion her, but that we assist hel' and disillusion 
her, eonvincing her people, not for the first time in Russian history, that 
Westem models and vaIues are irrelevant, if not downright harmfuI, lo their 
peculiarly Russian circumstances and predicaments. 
5.3 He will nol solve Ihis problem by arguing amongst ourselves. 
The issue is nol how we decide to use aid, but how lhe end user decides to 
use it. Today, the end useI' is not «Yeltsim>, but the tens of thousands who 
work in ministries, manage state enlerprises (and cosmeticalIy privatised 
«concems»), sit on local soviets and chair oblast committees. Their first 
concem is survival: an objective which will be largely accomplished if they 
cao convert Soviet style bureaucratic powel' into financiaI power. For this 
reason, most of them will have very different notions from our own as to 
what aid is do!'». If YeItsin cannot alter their thinking and behaviour, we 
will not be able to do so eilher. 
5.4. Assistance (ar commerciaI investment) can produce results where 
the Russian end user has a personal stake in satisfying the Westem danar 
aod where Ihat danar (ar customer) has a «hands on» relationship with his 
Russian c1ienl. Such assistaoce will, for lhe most part, be labour intensive, 
time consuming and smal! in scale: tens of millions per annum rather than 
tens of billions which YeItsin seeks. 
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VI. IMPLlCAT/ONS FOR WESTERN SECURITY POLlCY 
6.1. Contrary to current orthodoxy, Russia has a foreign policy. Its 
most obvious and urgent aim is to transform the world into Russia's life 
support system_ Its more serious aim is to provi de the anti dote to internai 
disintegration: the integration and «merging» of economic groupings and 
security structures. This latter aim is the straightforward continuation, under 
Kozyrev's auspiees, of Shevardnadzian <<llew thinking»: a policy which 
sought in its initial phase the «elimination of enemy images» and in its more 
parasitieal post-1988 phase, the creation of a genuinely <dnter-related, inter-
dependent and integral world». 
6.2. Thus, «integrating the East into our security structures» is not 
merely a western project, but a major plank of Russian foreign policy. In 
reality, this formula is the expression of a problem rather than the solution 
to one. Questions and choices need to be faced. 
a. Who is to be integrated into what? Poles and Czechs are neither 
flattered nor reassured when we propose to associate Russia - their 
past and most likely future adversary - with the very security bodies 
that they look to for protection. 
b. Who will guarantee that an integrated Russia will be a sociable 
Russia? What can We look forward to if the «war party» turns out 
to be the beneficiary of Kozyrev's foreign policy and the demilita-
rised Europe he seeks? (a question which Kozyrev has recently 
raised himself). 
c. Who is to be defended against whom? «Collective security» is a 
recipe for impotence when the threat to security come fram within 
the collective itse\f. 
d. How will deterrence be maintained? To date, deterrence has rested 
on the perception that an attack on one NATO member will be treated 
as an attack on ali. Hence the preoccupation of NATO professionals: 
that commitments be accompanied by capabilities and by cIear 
demonstrations of political wilI. In a post-cold war world, this preoc-
cupation is bound to become an anxiety. If this can be said for 
existing commitments, how realistie is it to contemplate new ones, 
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not to speak of new members? Is there the remotest prospect that 
British or American electorates will countenance war over the inde-
pendence of Ukraine or the inviolability of Poland's eastem frontier? 
If the price of NATO's enlargement is a dilution of its cohesion and 
effectiveness, will enlargement prove a blessing or a curse? If, to 
the contrary, we shut the door on Poland, the Czech lands and 
Hungary, wilI this mollify the Russian «war party» or embolden it? 
VII. CONCLUSION 
7.1. The colIapse of the Soviet Union should focus our thinking rather 
than dulI it. It compels us to think about defence as much as security, about 
Western interests as much as common interests. Above ali, it obliges us to 
preserve NATO's integrity and freedom of action. In future, NATO may 
be constrained to deter Russian misconduct not through the threat of force, 
but through the threat of rearmament. Russia's leaders - deeply impressed 
by the adaptability of Westem democracies - wilI find this threat more 
convincing than may Westemers, but only if NATO remains an autonomous 
and militarily serious aIliance. The Reagan-Rogers military buildup left 
a strong mark on Russian military commanders. They would not wish 
to provoke a sequei to it. 
7.2. The Soviet colIapse is more likely to produee a time of troubles 
than a time of upheaval: troubles with littIe chance of engulfing Europe, but 
every chance of impinging upon it. Russia's future directly affects the 
destinies of ex-Soviet republics, the prospects of the East European states 
and through them, the welI-being and tranquillity of Europe as a whole. 
If the worst can be avoided, there will be no eomfort for those who believe 
that history has ended. To the eontrary, it is being made. If we conduet 
ourselves as speetators rather than as hard-headed protagonists, we may find, 
in more respects than one, that it is made at our expense. 
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